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Abstract 
We present simple general equilibrium models of resource allocation, factor 
income distribution, and trade among nations that are technologically iden-
tical, but different in tastes. Under conditions of autarky, this paper highlights 
the importance of “tastes” that determine the intra-national factor shares of 
returns to productive factors. We demonstrate how a stronger taste for speci-
fied factor-intensive goods leads to higher returns to factors intensively used. 
Trade, in our model, however, erases both intra-national and inter-national 
factor income inequalities caused by taste differences. Trade, therefore, is no 
good news to those factors and income groups benefitting from autarky. Free 
trade therefore is a difficult proposal not only in practice, but also in theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Main determinants of international trade are known in the literature to include 
differences in the methods of production (Ricardo), factor endowments (Heckscher- 
Ohlin), and tastes (or demand patterns a la Linder). While the study of tastes as 
a determinant of international trade has attracted little attention, we feel that 
further analysis is warranted. According to Jagdish Bhagwati [[1], pp. 27-29], 
Linder’s central thesis is that the higher the volume of trade will be, the greater 
the similarity is in the demand patterns of the pair of trading countries (in 
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Linder [[2], pp. 94-95]1). 
Among these three different models the third one is hitherto least known, but 
not least important. Noting this apparent discrepancy, this paper attempts to 
narrow it by focusing on taste differences (rather than the similarities that 
Linder stressed) between otherwise identical trade partners, endowed with both 
identical technologies and identical sets of productive factors2. Expanding on 
Linder’s work, we propose to move beyond the focus on similarities in taste, and 
examine how differences in taste affect international trade. Similar to Linder we 
will assume that the trade partners are otherwise identical, endowed with both 
identical technologies and identical sets of productive factors. 
Moreover, this paper is also motivated by a beauty of simplicity to present our 
models of production, distribution, and trade. Proposed accordingly are general 
equilibrium (GE) models with two factor inputs, two outputs, and two nations. 
The two factors of production are allocated to two sectors to produce two kinds 
of goods under alternative conditions of autarky and free trade. Proposed 
models are therefore referred to as the 2 2 2× ×  GE models. The simple models 
are moreover made even simpler by only one CD (Cobb-Douglas) parameter to 
represent both intra-national differences in technologies and international 
differences in tastes. Nevertheless, the models are analytically solvable for all the 
assumed endogenous variables explicitly in terms of the assumed one single 
parameter. 
Our single parameter modeling makes, without much loss of generality, the 
rich content of GE theory, such as the Stolper-Samuelson, readily available to the 
general reader as well as specialists in the field. 
Our purpose therefore is twofold: 1) to present the simplest possible GE 
model of production, and resource allocation (pursuant to Ohta [10] directly, 
also to Jensen [11] indirectly); and 2) to reveal the bitter maxim of the Stolper- 
Samuelson theorem and the related proposal to “bribe” by Stolper and 
Samuelson [[12], p.73] for free trade3. 
The original Walras GE model has long remained almost forlorn due to its 
gigantic structure sometimes referred to as a huge “empty box”. We attempt at 
 
 
1From the empirical standpoint, Armington [3] may also deserve mention, even more than Linder 
perhaps, for considering taste differences as important ingredients of trade theory, but as an ano-
nymous referee points out its basic assumptions are “quite different” from our present model below. 
2Bhagwati [[4], p. 46], in describing the world economy towards the end of the last century, refers to 
“kaleidoscopic” comparative advantage. Due to globalized “fierce competition”, argues Bhagwati, 
“slight shifts in costs” can easily shift “comparative advantage”, owing to modern effective commu-
nication and large bulk transportation. Therefore, the traditional supply side arguments of Ricardo 
and Heckscher-Ohlin predicated upon static and stable comparative advantage may no longer speak 
for themselves. In addition, it is also well known from many empirical studies starting from Leon-
tief’s seminal work [5], e.g., Trefler [6] that the Leontief paradox does exist. Focusing on taste dif-
ferences, therefore, on the demand side of the theoretical argument may now deserve increasing at-
tention. Along these lines recent contributions of particular interest, if not directly related to the 
present inquiry, include the discussions of optimal trans-Pacific trade barrier by Hübler [7], tourism 
to international trade by Santana-Gallego et al. [8], and the so-called product sophistication relevant 
to the stability of international trade by Córcoles et al. [9] among many others. 
3In a nutshell we present both what Kemp [13] refers to as the “WADM model” of general equili-
brium and the Stolper-Samuelson theory of trade. [Here WADM stands for Walras [14], Arrow and 
Debreu [15], and McKenzie [16]]. 
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making the huge complex model as simple as possible so as to reveal the original 
importance of the Stolper-Samuelson theory4. 
In what follows, Section 2 sets forth the formal mathematical system of 
equations along with the underlying assumptions to represent our simple 2 2×  
GE model without trade. Section 3 in turn sets forth a 2 2 2× ×  GE model of 
trade between two technologically identical nations that, however, have different 
national tastes. Section 4 discusses the GE solutions (with diagrams) for the 
autarky economies and the two free trading economies. Section 5 concludes. 
Figure 1 is produced in Latex. All the other computer generated Figures 2-7 are 
programmed in C-language and executed on the GCC version 4.0.1 compiler 
(Apple Computer, Inc.), and produced in Latex. The verified reliability of the 
simulation results in double precision (1.0e−15). 
2. The Closed 2× 2 Economies 
2.1. Assumptions 
We begin with an autarky model predicated on the following assumptions:  
(A1-1) A country produces two final homogeneous goods: bananas B and nuts 
N.  
(A1-2) The country is endowed with two primary factors of production: 
capital K (owned by capitalists) and labor L (owned by workers).  
(A1-3) The total factor endowments are normalized to unity: 1L K= = .  
(A1-4) The sector production functions are of CD technologies, such that in 
the sector producing B, the output elasticity of labor is α , and that of capital is 
( )1 α− , whereas in the sector producing N, the output elasticity of labor is 
( )1 α− , and that of capital is α .  
(A1-5) Consumers (workers and capitalists) in the same country have 
identical tastes, defined by the same CD utility function, such that in one 
country, the parameter α  is the utility elasticity of good N, and ( )1 α−  that of 
good B; in the other country, these utility parameters are reversed.  
Pursuant to these assumptions we now present our simplest possible models 
in what follows.  
2.2. The 2×2 Autarky Economies—1 CD Parameter Model 
Let us begin by describing a country, say, the Banana Country, which is producing 
two kinds of goods, bananas B and nuts N. Their production functions are 
specifiable subject to Assumption (A1-4) as:  
( ) 1,B B B BB g L K L Kα α−= =                     (1) 
 
 
4A similar phrase “Of Empty Economic Boxes” in Clapham [17] refers to such general verbal con-
cepts as marginal, diminishing returns, returns to scale, etc. These abstract concepts appeared hard 
indeed to be applied to real world analysis until Cobb and Douglas [18] first proposed an empirically 
testable production function applied to US Manufacturing. While following along this line by using 
the parametric CD forms extensively, we also make the size of the huge box the smallest possible for 
analytical simplicity. Cf. Fullerton and Ta [19] for a similar treatment of general equilibrium analysis 
(of tax incidence rather than the present interest of trade incidence) predicated upon the specific 
Cobb-Douglass production functions. 
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( ) 1,N N N NN f L K L Kα α−= =                     (2) 
where ( )( ).B g=  and ( )( ).N f=  are specific CD functions of capital iK  
and labor iL  ( ,i B N= ) used in the subscripted sectors, B and N, respectively, 
the superscript α  above represents “output elasticity” of capital in the N sector 
and also “output elasticity” of labor in the B sector. This is a deliberate 
contrivance (assumption) to differentiate the two sectors’ methods of production 
by a single parameter α . 
The contrivance is deliberate in the sense that it is intended simply, yet 
generally, to derive the so-called contract curve CC in the familiar Edgeworth 
(endowment) box as a rectangular hyperbola in Allen [20] from a couple of 
Cobb-Douglas functions with distinct CD parameters α  and β . Our present 
model with one parameter may appear to contradict the more general two- 
parameter outcome, but it does not. In fact, the present single parameter is 
contrived to represent two distinct CD parameters α  and β , which is required, 
however, 1β α= − 5. 
Utility functions of workers and of capitalists are defined, by Assumption 
(A1-5) above, as:  
( ) 1,K K K K KU B N B Nα α−=                      (3) 
( ) 1,L L L L LU B N B Nα α−=                      (4) 
where ( ).U s on the left hand side are identical functions of B and N consumed 
by the factor suppliers K (capitalists) and L (workers) having the same tastes. It 
is to be noted here that the same parameter α  used to represent the production 
technology above in (1) and (2) is once again used to represent the consumers’ 
utility functions (3) and (4).  
These assumptions lead to the relevant optimization conditions subject to the 
budget constraints to follow below.  
Consumptive Optimum: Equi-marginal utility MU per Dollar  
( )
1
1 K K
K K
B N
N B
B N
p p
α α
α α
−
   
−    
   =
                   
(5) 
( )
1
1 L L
L L
B N
N B
B N
p p
α α
α α
−
   
−    
   =
                   
(6) 
where the left hand side numerators are the factor provider ( )K L ’s MU of 
banana B, the right hand sides are the corresponding MU of nuts N, and ip  
( ,i B N= ) is the price of ith good.  
Individual Budget Constraints:  
B K N Kr p B p N= +                       (7) 
 
 
5The CC concavity thus contrived may be interpreted as a proxy for the extent of the differences in 
the “methods of production” in Stolper and Samuelson [12]. This is because the more concave (or 
convex) the CC, the more different the methods of production are, in terms of relative factor inten-
sities. 
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B L N Lw p B p N= +                        (8) 
where r is rental rate on capital (capitalists’ income), w wage rate (workers’ 
income), iB  bananas consumed, and iN  nuts consumed, respectively, by 
factor owners of K and L.  
Related to the consumptive optimum are the productive/allocative optimum 
conditions, followed in turn by the market equilibrium conditions that must 
follow consecutively below. Thus,  
Productive/Allocative Optimum (Equi-Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution, 
MRTS):  
1 NL
K N
Kfw
r f L
α
α
  −
= = 
                        
(9) 
1
L B
K B
g Kw
r g L
α
α
 
= = 
−                       
(10) 
where the left-hand sides of equations above represent the relative wage rate to 
rental rate w r  and the right-hand sides the relative marginal product of 
factors ( L KMP MP= ) in the sector i  ( ,B N= ), respectively. Note that while 
the left-hand sides, w r , are identical, the right-hand sides are defined as 
distinctively different functions of capital/labor ratio i iK L  in sector i  
( ,B N= ).  
Factor market equilibrium:  
1B NK K+ =                         (11) 
1B NL L+ =                          (12) 
where total factor supplies (endowments), respectively, of ( )1K =  and ( )1L = , 
are required to be demanded by (allocated to) two sectors B and N, respectively.  
Product market equilibrium:  
K LB B B= +                         (13) 
K LN N N= +                         (14) 
where B and N supplied are to be demanded, respectively, by factors K and L in 
respective sectors.  
Finally required for general equilibrium to be reached are the following 
conditions for income distribution.  
Factor Income distribution (Factor Cost):  
B B Bp B wL rK= +                       (15) 
N N Np N wL rK= +                       (16) 
where the left-hand sides are value outputs (revenues) of B and N, respectively, 
and the right-hand sides are the corresponding factor incomes distributed to 
labor L and capital K. 
The system of equations above has 16 equations in 16 unknown variables: w , 
r , Bp , Np , BK , BL , NK , NL , KB , LB , KN , LN , B , N , LU , and 
KU . However, in light of the Walras’ Law only 15 equations are independent. 
H. Kawano et al. 
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So the system is determinate only if all the prices are treated as relative prices, 
relative to, say, Np . Given the specific production functions and utility 
functions of the CD type as assumed above, our autarky GE-equation system can 
then be solved explicitly for each/all the 15 endogenous variables above in terms 
of one single parameter, namely α . All these parametric autarky GE solutions— 
for both Banana (b) and Nuts (n) countries—are given in Table 1 below (with 
further explanations). 
The following observations are important:  
1) When 1 2α = : The two production functions become identical. Also the 
consumer tastes are such that both bananas B and nuts N are equally appreciated.  
2) When 1 2α > : The output elasticity of N with respect to capital is larger 
than that with respect to labor. It follows that the N sector becomes capital 
intensive, and the B sector labor intensive. It also means that the utility elasticity 
of nuts in Banana country (b), (3)-(4), is higher than that of bananas, implying a 
stronger taste for N than for B6.  
3) The larger the parameter α  (exceeding 1/2), the higher the capital 
intensity of the capital-intensive N sector is, also the higher the labor intensity of 
the B sector by comparison, and vice versa7. This in effect is a corollary to 2), 
and an increasingly higher α  also requires an increasingly higher taste for N 
than for B, and vice versa8.  
The observations above lead to certain particular relations of optimal factor 
allocations and output mix known, respectively, as the so-called “contract curve” 
CC and the “production possibilities frontier” PPF. The CC and PPF, however, 
are pre-GE outcomes derived from the technology/endowment Assumptions 
(A1-A4) only. Although the tastes/preferences (A-5) are yet to be introduced for 
autarky general equilibrium to obtain, note how CC may be related to PPF. 
2.3. Equi-MRTS to Yield MRT (CC Related to PPF): Pre-GE Relations 
Focusing on autarky, when 1 2α >  ( 1 2α < ), we shall see that our contract 
curves are concave (convex) curves in the factor space ( ,L K ). The optimal 
sectoral factor allocation condition is given by combining (9) and (10):  
between Sectors and .B NMRTS MRTS B N=             (17) 
This equation is further by (9-10) written as:  
dd 1 ,
d 1 d
N NB B
B B N N
K KK K
L L L L
α α
α α
   −
− = = − =   
−   
          (18.1) 
 
 
6If 1 2α < , the N sector becomes labor intensive, and the B sector capital intensive. 
7That is, the lower the α  (below 1/2), the higher the labor intensity of the labor-intensive B sector. 
8There exists no priori reason for any particular good produced with any given factor input more 
intensively used than the other factor, to be also preferred more, consumed more than the other 
good. Indeed no technology parameter Tα  need be identical to preference parameter Pα . The 
only reason for assuming the preference parameter identical to the technology parameter is to mi-
nimize the number of parameters used to just one, and nothing else. Subject assumption is a mere 
expediency. We could begin with a more conventional, more inclusive assumptions set. But applying 
Occam’s razor leads to the present choice of the single parameter α . Also cf. Basmann [21] for his 
reference to the “freedom of (introducing) assumptions”. 
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Hence we get,  
1 .
1
NB
B N
KK
L L
α α
α α
−
=
−
                   (18.2) 
which combined with the conditions of a given total endowments of L and K, 
both assumed to be unity (11-12) yields a unique relation between NL  and 
NK  (and hence between BL  and BK ) in the factor space ( ,L K ): 
( )
2 2
1
1 1 11 1 1 1 1
N
N
N N
N
L
K
L L
Lα α
= =
    − − − + − −    
    
         (19) 
Geometrically, the expression (19) represents concave or convex curves that 
are rectangular hyperbolas, cf. Allen [[20], p.74]. Thus the upshot is a familiar 
Edgeworth box diagram of a contract curve (CC), shown by panel a) in Figure 1. 
The CC (19) is strictly concave for the CD parameter 1 2α > , assumed for the 
time being to apply to either one of the two technologically clone nations. This 
concave curve CC is the standard locus of back-to-back tangency points of the 
two-good isoquant curves. 
Connected to (19) is another curve (always concave), relating the ordered 
efficient pairs ( NL , NK ) from the CC curve to their ordered pair (B, N) of 
maximum outputs, shown in a separate quadrant (B, N) in Figure 1. This PPF 
curve, called production possibilities frontier, may formally be given by an 
implicit function T, (20)9. 
( );N T B α=                         (20) 
Regarding (19) and (20), both CC and PPF are uniquely given for any given 
CD parameter α  as aforementioned (See (3) and (4) supra). Thus, given the 
technologies underscoring α  being the same for the two countries, their CCs 
are the same, and so are the PPFs10. 
Consider now a point ( )0 0,N NL K  on CC and another related point ( )0 0,B N  
on PPF, both points labeled nE , Figure 1 panels (a) and (b) above. These two 
related points illustrate an autarkic equilibrium for the Nutties that love N more 
than B, rather than do the Bananans as trade partners to be discussed in the next 
section. This is because even though the technologies represented by the two 
curves CC and PPF are identical, final equilibrium points on them are to be 
identified/determined by tastes. Thus, if bananas are preferred to nuts instead, 
then more bananas than nuts must be produced/consumed, and the final general 
equilibrium points must be determined and represented elsewhere in Figure 1 
above, not at nE . 
 
 
9This curve (points) of the implicit function T, (20), mapping ( ;B α ) to N, is derived formally from 
Equations ((1), (2), (11), (12) and (19)) for the expanded domain of ( 1 0α> > ), which can be nu-
merically solved fully by computer. 
10The more precise, yet more general, relations between the two curves, and more importantly on 
final equilibrium points thereon are to be shown in more detail below in Figure 4 & Figure 5 for 
varying values of α  in (0, 1). Jensen [[22], pp. 66-69] also discusses how PPF and CC curves for 
CD/CES autarky economies may be derived from the relative factor prices, commodity prices, and 
capital/labor ratios. 
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Figure 1. The CC and PPF curves, upon which general equilibrium points are identified 
by taste, given α > 1/2. (a) Optimal factor allocations; (b) optimal output mixes. 
 
Though not shown explicitly upon Figure 1, if the Bananans have a strong 
taste for bananas, they must allocate more resources to produce (and consume) 
more bananas than the Nutties do. Because of our simplified one parameter 
model of α , the Bananans’ strong taste for bananas require their utility 
elasticity of bananas to be represented by 1 1 2α− <  so as to make them love 
more bananas than nuts. 
These distinct tastes of the two otherwise clone nations (with 1 2α > ) can 
thus be represented, on both PPF and CC curves identified either above or below 
midpoints thereof, by the Nutties’ taste 1 2α >  and the Bananans’ taste 
( )1 1 2α− < , respectively. Specifically, the partitioned parts (of points on CC 
and PPF) above their midpoints represent the Nutties’ equilibrium, and the parts 
below represent the Bananans’ counterpart optimum, to be explained more fully 
in the next section. 
Given the Nutties’ taste parameter 1 2α > , cum the technology parameter 
1 2α > , the share of returns to capitalist (rental income) must strictly exceed 
1/2 and the share of wage income, by comparison, fall below 1/2 in the Nuts 
country. It then follows that the Nuttie workers under autarky must be poorer 
than their capitalist neighbors accordingly11. 
Specifically, wage rate given by factor allocation identified at any point along 
the CC curve above its midpoint (circled in white above) must be strictly lower 
than unity. At this white-circled point, MRTS is required to be unity12. The 
corresponding wage rate at this point is unity. Not only relative factor price is 
unity at this point on CC, but also unity is the corresponding relative product 
price identified at a point on the PPF on the right13. 
 
 
11By the same token, given the Bananans’ distinct taste parameter ( )1 1 2α− < , cum the same 
technology parameter 1 2α >  (same as the Bananan’s), the share of capitalist rental income must 
fall below 1/2 and the share of wage income, by comparison, must exceed 1/2. Hence, the Bananan 
workers under autarky must be strictly richer than their capitalist neighbors. 
12This follows because the CC curve is the loci of the two-sector iso-quant curves’ tangency points 
facing to one another. The slope of the tangency at the point of intersection of CC and the 45 degree 
auxiliary line 1K L= −  must be unity. 
13See Table 1 for complete analytical solutions in terms of α . 
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Thus, on CC and PPF above one single parameter 1 2α >  can be used to 
identify two points above and two points below the two white circles, 
respectively. The two such distinct points along PPF show two distinct national 
tastes and two related points along CC, by contrast, represent distinctive 
resource allocations of two technologically clone nations. The four points 
identifiable by just one parameter 1 2α >  along PPF and CC above thus point 
to equilibrium resource allocations and related output mixes of two clone 
nations, having different tastes, however. 
Related observations of particular importance are:  
1) Even within the confines of our “ideal types” model, “ruthless outcomes” of 
income distribution aforementioned are unavoidable unless 1 2α = , which 
requires two clone nations to be identical in both tastes and technologies. If 
people have an unbalanced and skewed taste, for either nuts or bananas, the 
degree of bias will, by our basic assumption, influence the methods of 
production. The stronger the skewed taste, the greater the differences in the 
methods of production will be in equilibrium between the two sectors. Thus, the 
more the α  deviates from 1 2α = , the greater the income inequality.  
2) Such a ruthless outcome is inevitable despite the larger pie of nuts and 
bananas, under the conditions of distinctively different methods of production.  
3) No ruthless outcomes will arise only if methods of production are assumed 
identical, 1 2α = .  
4) Only under such special (technological) conditions everybody will be 
equally remunerated, but equally poor as well, regardless of tastes.  
The two autarky economies with all their associated endogenous variables are 
represented by their explicit solutions in terms of the single parameter α  in 
Table 1—see Appendix. 
3. The Open Economies: 2 × 2 × 2 GE Model 
3.1. Assumptions 
The simplest possible 2 2 2× ×  general equilibrium model of trade, once again 
by the same one single CD parameter, is now in order, but with basically the 
same assumptions as those introduced in Section 1. Assumptions with an 
asterisk below, however, should be noted for differences from the preceding 
assumptions.  
(A2-1)* There are two clone nations: Nuts Country and Banana Country, 
respectively labeled n and b. 
(A2-2) Same as (A1-2). 
(A2-3) Same as (A1-3). 
(A2-4) Same as (A1-4). 
(A2-5)* The two countries’ national tastes are different such that n’s taste is 
represented by the same CD parameter of α  for nuts and ( )1 α−  for bananas, 
whereas the b’s taste is reversed; the b’s taste for nuts is given by ( )1 α− , and 
that for bananas by α .  
The assumed differences, both in methods of production and in tastes, are 
H. Kawano et al. 
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Table 1. Two-country autarky equilibrium: Solutions given by preference/technology parameter α : 0 1α< < . 
 Country j  ( ),n b=  Variable Definitions Equilibrium Solutions for n Equilibrium Solutions for b 
(1) NjL  L employed in j to produce N 
1
2
 ( )
2
2
1
1 2 2
α
α α
−
− +
 
(2) BjL  L employed in j to produce B 
1
2
 
2
21 2 2
α
α α− +
 
(3) NjK  K employed in j to produce N 
2
21 2 2
α
α α− +
 1
2
 
(4) BjK  K employed in j to produce B 
( )2
2
1
1 2 2
α
α α
−
− +
 
1
2
 
(5) jN  N produced in j ( )
2
1 22 1 2 2
α
αα
α
α α− − +
 ( )
( )
( )
2 1
12
1
2 1 2 2
α
αα
α
α α
−
−
−
− +
 
(6) jB  B produced in j 
( ) ( )
( )
2 1
12
1
2 1 2 2
α
αα
α
α α
−
−
−
− +
 
( )
2
1 22 1 2 2
α
αα
α
α α− − +
 
(7) j
j
w
r
 Relative wage rate in j ( )
2
2 1
1 2 2
α α
α α
−
− +
 
( ) 1
2
2 1
1 2 2
α α
α α
−
− 
 
− + 
 
(8) Bj
Nj
p
p
 Relative price of B in j 
( )
1 2
21 2 2
2 1
α
α α
α α
−
 − +
  − 
 
( )
( )1 2
21 2 2
2 1
α
α α
α α
− −
 − +
  − 
 
(9) jKB  B produced in j and consumed by K (capitalists) 
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 21 1 2 2
2
αα
α
α α α−− − +
 
( )
( )
1 2
2
2 1
1 2 2
α α
α
α α
α α
+ −
− +
 
(10) jLB  B produced in j and consumed by L (workers) 
( )
( )
3 21
12
2 1
1 2 2
αα
α
α α
α α
−−
−
−
− +
 ( )
12 2
1
1 2 2
2
αα
α
α α α
−
−
− +
 
(11) jKN  N produced in j and consumed by K (capitalists) 
( )12 2
1
1 2 2
2
αα
α
α α α
−
−
− +
 
( )
( )
3 21
12
2 1
1 2 2
αα
α
α α
α α
−−
−
−
− +
 
(12) jLN  N produced in j and consumed by L (workers) 
( )
( )
1 2
2
2 1
1 2 2
α α
α
α α
α α
+ −
− +
 ( )
( ) ( )2 1 21 1 2 2
2
αα
α
α α α−− − +
 
NOTE: In the table 
d
d
j
j
j
N
MRT
B
 
≡ −  
 
 and 
d
d
j
j
j
N
MRS
B
 
≡ −  
 
, then ( ), Country ,Bjj j
Nj
p
MRT MRS j b n
p
= = =  at the autarky equilibrium. Also note that 
given the unrestricted domain for α , each country may prefer either one of the two goods to the other. Thus, if 1 2α < , contra the Figure 1 assumption 
of 1 2α > , the Nutties may love bananas more than nuts, and vice versa for Bananans. 
 
thus represented by one single CD parameter α , signifying both technology 
and taste/preference. Pursuant to these assumptions we now proceed to derive 
2 2 2× ×  open general equilibrium conditions of production, related resource 
allocation/distribution, and consumption. 
3.2. The 2 × 2 × 2 One CD Parameter Model of Trade 
We begin by defining the two clone countries’ production functions in terms of 
only one CD parameter α  to differentiate the two sectors’ production 
functions: 
The B Sector:  
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( ) ( )1 , , Sectors ; , Countriesj ij ijB L K i B N j b nα α−= = =         (21) 
The N Sector:  
( ) ( )1 , , Sectors ; , Countriesj ij ijN L K i B N j b nα α−= = =         (22) 
where the subscripts i and j stand for the sector i (= B for bananas, N for nuts) 
and the Country j (= b for Bananans, n for Nutties), respectively. Subject to these 
production functions the optimization conditions for factor allocations yield a 
convex production possibilities set with its frontier PPF: concave function from 
jB  to jN . 
Given 1 2α >  (or 1 2< ), either one of the two identical PPFs for the clone 
countries b and n may be transposed and made tangent to the other PPF for 
purposes of international trade. The two such PPFs that are tangent to one 
another and back-to-back are illustrated by Ohta [[18], Figure 2.3] as a point for 
productive optimum under free trade. It is then straightforward to identify the 
related points for consumptive optimum after trade for the trading partner 
countries b and n, respectively, given their respective tastes: α  and ( )1 α− . 
(See the 8 such optimum points demonstrated by the solutions (9) through (16), 
Table 2 infra.) 
Let us next consider the two countries’ indifference curves that are derived 
from their national utility functions represented by the same single parameter 
α  as follows. 
The Bananans:  
( ) ( ) ( )1,c c c cb b b bU B N B N
α α−
=
                   
(23) 
The Nutties:  
( ) ( ) ( )1,c c c cn n n nU B N B N
α α−
=
                   
(24) 
Note carefully here that although U’s of the two national consumptions cbB  
and cbN  for country b, and 
c
nB  and 
c
nN  for country n are defined by the 
identical parameter α , the larger the 1 2α > , the stronger are both the Nutties’ 
taste for nuts and the Bananans’ taste for bananas14. Total consumptions by 
individual factor suppliers must add up to total outputs jB  and JN  produced 
in both countries. Thus, individual factor consumptions (9) to (16) on Table 2 
infra are given by 
b b b b
c
b nK nL bK bLB B B B B= + + + , b b b b
c
b nK nL bK bLN N N N N= + + + , 
n n n n
c
n nK nL bK bLB B B B B= + + + , and n n n n
c
n nK nL bK bLN N N N N= + + + .  
The conditions for consumptive optimum are then given by:  
( ), , CountriesBjBNj
Nj
p
MRS j b n
p
= =
               
(25) 
The related conditions for optimizing factor allocation are given by:  
( ), , CountriesjBNj
j
w
MRTS j b n
r
= =
               
(26) 
 
 
14Conversely, if 1 2α < , the stronger are both the Nutties’ taste for bananas and the Bananans’ taste 
for nuts. 
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Given the specific production functions and utility functions of the CD type as 
assumed above, the system can then be solved for all the 16 endogenous 
variables above in terms of one parameter, namely α  in each country.  
4. The 2 × 2 × 2 GE Model of Trade Compared to Autarky 
Remember that the system of equations set forth in Section 1 applies to either 
country b or n before trade (autarky). It is now solvable again in terms of α  
only (1 0α> > ) for the 12 variables jNL , jBL , jNK , jBK , jN , jB , ( ) jw r , 
( )B N jp p , jKB , jLB , jKN , and jLN  ( ),j b n= , are summarized in Table 1. 
Numerical solutions to the model are also derivable. Figure 2 illustrates the 
autarky solution set of outputs ( ),B N  as a unique function of ( )0,1α ∈ . It 
illustrates how a change in α  deviating either above or below 1/2 may generate 
a unique trade-off between production of nuts and bananas, but only up to a 
certain critical point of α , beyond which both outputs (and consumptions) of B 
and N start to increase with no trade-offs thereafter. 
Thus, if both the methods of production and tastes for goods are different 
enough ( 0.18α <  or 0.82α > ), then the greater the differences in taste and 
technology, the greater is the number of both goods under autarky. This is not to 
say, however, that a small difference in taste or technology is bad news. Any 
small deviation from 1 2α =  indeed yields a strict increase in national welfare 
as implied by a solid locus staying above the linear 45 degree line representing 
PPF in the case 1 2α = , Figure 2. Here the solid (upper-left) curve in Figure 2 
represents a (one-to-one) function from a parameter set [ ]1 2,1α =  to a locus 
set ( ),B N  of equilibrium output mixes. 
This particular set corresponds to, and is also shown by, a U-shaped 
non-monotonic ( )ATn ATbB N=  curve vis-a-vis a monotonically increasing 
( )ATn ATbN B=  curve in Figure 3, which shows how a strictly stronger preference 
for nuts than bananas yields the equilibrium output mix of ( ),B N  over the 
parameter set [ ]1 2,1α = . The solid (lower-right) curve in Figure 2, by 
comparison, is the locus ( ),B N , which is now shown by a non-monotonic 
( )ATn ATbN B=  curve vis-a-vis a monotonically diminishing ( )ATn ATbB N=  
curve in Figure 3. This part of Figure 3 is derived from [ ]0,1 2α = , which 
presupposes a stronger preference for bananas than nuts. 
Also depicted here, strictly above the two asymmetric curves ( )ATn ATbN B=  
and ( )ATn ATbB N= , are two symmetric U-shaped curves. Of the two, note the 
lower curve is a vertical sum of the ATb ATnN N+  and ATb ATnB B+ , hence 
labeled ATn ATbN N+  ( ATn ATbB B= + ). It depicts the aggregate output either 
bananas or nuts, produced by the two countries n and b, under conditions of 
autarky. The higher, topmost U-shaped curve, by comparison, depicts the 
aggregate world output (of either N or B) still greater under free trade than 
under autarky.  
As a further related note to Figure 3, if and when the parameter α  happens 
to be either large enough to exceed a certain critical value aforementioned of 
0.82, viz., 0.82α =  or small enough to be under 0.18, 0.18α = , which 
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Figure 2. Autarky Equilibrium Loci (B, N) for both Countries n and b: The PPF curves 
drawn for α = 0.9 (0.1); 0.8 (0.2); 0.5, upon which superimposed are equilibrium loci of 
goods B and N in countries n and b shown by black circles. 
 
 
Figure 3. Nuts (N) and Bananas (B) produced before and after trade: Individual nations’ 
outputs and their aggregates. Figure note: Over the sub-domain of α (0, 0.5), more B (N) 
is produced/consumed than N(B), while over the other sub-domain of α (0.5, 1.0), more 
N(B) than B(N), in country n(b). Also illustrated are aggregate outputs before and after 
trade, given α [0, 1]. Here AT stands for “Autarky”, and FT for “Free Trade”. 
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numerical values are model-specific15, then any further deviation thereof in α  
will increase the production of both nuts and bananas in a given clone country, 
be it the Banana Country or the Nuts Country. However, insofar as α  remains 
within the normal domain in-between 0.18 0.82α< < , then there will be strict 
trade-offs between nuts and bananas produced as α  changes in either direction. 
Thus, for example, if the value of α  approaches 0.18 or larger, then the output 
of bananas must keep declining while nuts start to increase (along the U-shaped 
curves of ( )ATn ATbB N=  and ( )ATn ATbN B= , respectively.) 
Within this normal domain (reflecting more balanced tastes and technologies), 
nuts increase with the parameter value α  more than bananas decrease and the 
former output surpasses the latter output as long as α  remains to exceed 1/2. The 
nuts production keeps increasing while bananas keep decreasing until α  reaches 
0.82. Remember in this connection that the larger α  implies not only a higher 
output elasticity of capital in the production of nuts, but also a stronger preference 
for nuts. So, more nuts are produced than bananas. This is why the aggregate 
two-country output (of either N or B, i.e., ATn ATbN N+  or ATn ATbB B+ , Figure 3) 
starts to increase as α  deviates from 1 2α =  to either increase or decrease. 
It warrants emphasis, however, that despite a strong taste for nuts, along with 
a high technology parameter α , high enough to approach unity, substantial 
amounts of bananas are also produced nonetheless. This is due to the high and 
low technology parameter effect of differences in the methods of production in 
the two assumed sectors. Related to this, and perhaps more important, is a 
certain intrinsic property of the CD function. Its factors are essentials as well as 
substitutes. This is because each factor is indispensable for the other. (Labor is as 
indispensable as capital is). 
However, once again, this is not to say that everybody will be happier if only 
national welfare increases with α  beyond 1/2 (or with smaller α  below 1/2). 
This is because unless 1 2α =  any taste differentials tend to bring about 
unequal income distribution under the market conditions of perfect competition. 
Behind the locus of ( ,n nB N ) as well as of ( ,b bB N ), in Figure 2, it is to be noted, 
are the solutions to the corresponding variables, depicted in Figure 3, all in 
terms of α . Related to these outcomes are interesting observations on factor 
allocations of ( ,L K ) for two clone nations with different national tastes. 
Namely, regardless of α , the related allocation of a certain factor that changes 
with α , the other factor allocation remains unaltered. Moreover, it remains 
constant at just half of its total endowment16!  
 
 
15The numerical values derived here are the model-specific (to the single α assumed). It goes without 
saying that a nonempty set of the methods of production that generate a strictly positive output ef-
fects in both (all) sectors may be derivable from the more general parametric conditions than the 
present single parameter. Cf. notes 7 and 8, however. 
16Intuitive interpretation thereof is as follows. Insofar as factor intensity remains neutral, as in case 
of 1 2α = , factor allocations to either sectors should remain equal, i.e., 1/2 in the present model. 
Given this reference departure point, the higher (lower) the α  is, the higher (lower) the utilization 
of the higher (lower) intensive factor will be. Since a more or less utilization is defined by deviation 
from this fixed ratio of 1/2, or half and half utilization of labor and capital, any deviation thereof 
must be defined relative to this reference half. Thus, either more or less intensively utilized factor 
alone moves while the other factor remains invariant at 1/2 within each one of the two sectors. 
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The particular factor is that used more intensively than the other factor. Thus 
in our present example of the nuts sector that uses capital more intensively than 
labor, the greater the α  (implying greater taste for nuts as well as greater 
output elasticity of capital), the greater the output and hence capital input in the 
capital-intensive sector. However, the other factor does not increase at all, 
remains instead its sector allocation constant, (1/2) as shown in Figure 4. 
Since the greater α  implies the greater taste for bananas, as in the Banana 
Country, then the same greater parameter α  requires the smaller taste for 
bananas in the Nuts Country, being represented by 1 α− , i.e., lower taste for 
bananas. If the Nuts Country’s more labor-intensive nuts sector is in greater 
demand, then more and more labor is needed to produce nuts while capital 
input remains constant, as in Figure 5. 
Related to impacts of α  upon total as well as sectoral outputs (Figure 3), 
and factor allocations (Figure 4, Figure 5) are the outcomes of income 
distribution. Let us now focus our attention on comparing factor prices between 
two factors within each country (intra-nationally) and between two clone 
countries (internationally) endowed with different national tastes. 
Figure 6 depicts the computed results of relative factor prices ( w r ) for two 
countries as a monotone function of α  under conditions of both autarky and 
free trade as well. Figure 6 does indeed reveal the remarkable implications of 
free trade vs. autarky—as does Figure 7 for the corresponding factor allocations 
 
 
Figure 4. Autarky equilibria in factor market space for varying α in country n. 
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Figure 5. Autarky equilibria in factor market space for varying α in country b. 
 
 
Figure 6. Impacts of taste/technology parameter α upon international as well as intrana-
tional income distribution. 
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loci. In the case of free trade between countries b and n, note that the system of 
equations set forth in Section 1 can be basically reapplied to both countries b and 
n under free trade. It is once again solvable in terms of α  only. The free trade 
GE solutions of our 2 2 2× ×  CD model are summarized in Table 2, cf. 
Appendix17. 
In comparing Table 1 and Table 2, note the following:  
1) When 1 2α = , the two countries are genuine clones producing both nuts 
and bananas equally and distributing them equally between workers and 
capitalists. So, 1w r = .  
2) For any 1 2α > , w r  is strictly less than unity in one country (Nuts  
 
Table 2. Two-country free-trade equilibrium: Given by preference/technology parameter α : 0 1α< < . 
 Country j ( ),n b=  Variable Definitions Equilibrium Solutions for n Equilibrium Solutions for b 
(1) NjL  L employed in j to produce N 1 α−  1 α−  
(2) BjL  L employed in j to produce B α  α  
(3) NjK  K employed in j to produce N α  α  
(4) BjK  K employed in j to produce B 1 α−  1 α−  
(5) jN  N produced in j ( )
11 ααα α −−  ( )11 ααα α −−  
(6) jB  B produced in j ( )
11 ααα α −−  ( )11 ααα α −−  
(7) j
j
w
r
 Relative wage rate in j 1 1 
(8) Bj
Nj
p
p
 Relative price of B in j 1 1 
(9) 
njK
N  N produced in j and consumed by K (capitalists) in n ( )
110.5 1 ααα α −+ −   
(Domestic Demand) 
( )110.5 1 ααα α −+ −   
(Export Demand) 
(10) 
njK
B  B produced in j and consumed by K (capitalists) in n ( )
20.5 1 ααα α −−   
(Domestic Demand) 
( )20.5 1 ααα α −−   
(Export Demand) 
(11) 
njL
N  N produced in j and consumed by L (workers) in n ( )
110.5 1 ααα α −+ −   
(Domestic Demand) 
( )110.5 1 ααα α −+ −   
(Export Demand) 
(12) 
njL
B  B produced in j and consumed by L (workers) in n ( )
20.5 1 ααα α −−   
(Domestic Demand) 
( )20.5 1 ααα α −−   
(Export Demand) 
(13) 
bjK
N  N produced in j and consumed by K (capitalists) in b ( )
20.5 1 ααα α −−   
(Export Demand) 
( )20.5 1 ααα α −−   
(Domestic Demand) 
(14) 
bjK
B  B produced in j and consumed by K (capitalists) in b ( )
110.5 1 ααα α −+ −   
(Export Demand) 
( )110.5 1 ααα α −+ −   
(Domestic Demand) 
(15) 
bjL
N  N produced in j and consumed by L (workers) in b ( )
20.5 1 ααα α −−   
(Export Demand) 
( )20.5 1 ααα α −−   
(Domestic Demand) 
(16) 
bjL
B  B produced in j and consumed by L (workers) in b ( )
110.5 1 ααα α −+ −   
(Export Demand) 
( )110.5 1 ααα α −+ −   
(Domestic Demand) 
NOTE (1): 1Bj
Nj
p
MRT MRS
p
= = = , ( )Country ,j n b=  at the free trade equilibrium between Countries n and b. NOTE (2): (5) = (9) + (11) + (13) + (15) 
for good N, and (6) = (10) + (12) + (14) + (16) for good B.  
 
 
17Table 2, in comparison with Table 1, is based on a generalized assumption on tastes: the Bananans 
may prefer either B or N, and the Nutties likewise, either B or N, while maintaining national taste 
differences (using just one parameter α  with the generalized domain [0, 1]). 
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Country here) and greater than unity in the other country (Banana Country). 
This implies that the workers in one country are poorer and those in the other 
country richer, respectively, than their capitalists.  
3) The intra-national income gaps furthermore widen increasingly within 
each of the two clone countries as α  increases.  
4) Thus, it warrants emphasizing that no international taste differential is 
needed for intra-national income inequality to occur. If only a skewed taste for 
one good over another exists, then intra-national income disparity is inescapable 
insofar as output elasticity is not equal to 1/2.  
5) It is thus not free trade per se that would cause income inequality, 
inasmuch as a domestic market can create horrendous factor price differentials 
even with no free trade.  
6) Under autarky not only intra-national income gaps but also international 
income gaps widen increasingly with α . Thus, for example, if α  exceeds 1/2 
or becomes larger, as seen from Figure 6, the Bananan workers become richer 
increasingly than not only their own capitalist neighbors, but also the Nuttie 
workers abroad (cf. line 7, Table 1).  
7) Free trade, although often alleged to bring about “ruthless” outcomes, 
actually favors all deserving individuals with factor price equalization. Here in 
our model complete equalization of incomes among all equally gifted, not only 
internationally, but also intra-nationally. All these outcomes are depicted in 
Figure 6 and also in Figure 7.  
Let us summarize before we conclude. Commodity prices are distinctively 
different before trade and so are factor prices between almost clone nations. One  
 
 
Figure 7. Free trade vs. autarky equilibria: (K, L) Loci in countries n and b. 
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factor could be very expensive because the preferred commodity had forced both 
factors to be used for a product that they are not equally suited to produce. The 
opening of trade permits the two countries to specialize less in production, and 
more in consumption, in accordance with their different tastes. All this is 
accomplished by factor reallocations induced by trade, thereby equalizing both 
commodity and factor prices. Thus, worldwide output gains from trade arise 
from free trade. And all countries could increase their consumption to a higher 
level along with a higher national welfare level. 
So, everybody ought to be happy with the outcomes of free trade as shown 
above. They ought to be, but aren’t. The reason is that the different tastes under 
conditions of autarky, keep a certain factor in each nation scarcer than the other 
nation’s identical factor even if their physical endowments are the same. Higher 
wages in one nation and higher rents in the other before trade, however, are 
nothing but quasi-rent. The market mechanism with free trade would surely 
wipe it out. Here lies an apparent incentive for rent seeking, so as to protect the 
quasi-rent as a vested interest granted under autarky government/legislation. 
5. Conclusions 
A simple GE model of production, distribution, and trade has shown some 
interesting rediscoveries of fundamental principles of economics, revealing the 
importance of intra-national differences not only in technology (even if human 
capability were alike), but also in taste, both skewed. 
Another discovery is the importance of not only the skewed taste within a 
country, but also international differences in skewed tastes, in creating large 
income gaps not only intra-nationally but also internationally. Such ruthless 
outcomes of income distribution (among equally gifted individuals) are 
inescapable only if no trade is permitted internationally. With trade, factor price 
equalization necessarily yields a stumbling block (revealed by the Stolper- 
Samuelson Theorem) to the vested interest group. They benefit from a skewed 
national taste before trade, but lose after trade, all the more if only the skewed 
taste cum technology parameter α  deviates more from 1 2α = , reflecting 
greater differences not only in the methods of production within each country 
but also in tastes internationally. 
A related finding is how the output effect of skewed methods of production 
can outweigh the negative effects of skewed tastes upon a production possibility 
frontier. Such a net output effect of a larger α , our single parameter assumed, 
may also sound surprising all the more for its paradoxical net output effect of 
skewed methods of production, outweighing the negative skewed taste effects 
upon a production possibility frontier. 
A sheer skewed difference in tastes, combined with skewed technology, can 
aggravate devastating ruthless outcomes in income distribution, as Figure 6 
demonstrates. No wonder free trade is such a difficult proposition not only in 
practice, but also more disturbingly in theory. 
Needless to say, our research is limited by the fact that we are presenting an 
H. Kawano et al. 
 
989 
“ideal types” model of a complex real world economy. As such, we have 
simplified our ideal world to include only those factors that we have deemed 
most salient. It is possible that we have included or excluded factors that may 
later prove to be significant or insignificant. While we feel confident that we 
have presented the best possible model, further research will elucidate 
complexities that we may have yet overlooked.  
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Appendix  
Economic Analytical Relations behind Table 1 & Table 2 
Table 1. The seminal studies on two-sector models (as in Table 1) are Uzawa 
[23] [24]. Stated briefly, the key to derive analytic solutions for all the 
endogenous variables is to get explicitly the general equilibrium relation between 
the factor endowment ratio, K L k= , and wage-rental ratio ( )w r : 
( )k w r= Ψ , cf. Jensen [[11], p. 63]. 
Thus we must here obtain the autarky GE function Ψ  and its inverse 1−Ψ :  
( ) ( )1, ; ,j j j j j j j j j jk K L w r w r k j b n−= = Ψ = Ψ =        (27) 
With CD two-sector technologies and CD consumer preferences, the 
Walrasian general equilibrium (27) becomes, see Jensen [[11], p. 69; equation 
74], Jensen [[22], p. 73; equation 79],  
( ) ( )
( )
( )2 2 1
2 2 1
; ,
1
j
j
a a a
k w r w r j b n
a a a
α
α
− −
= Ψ = ⋅ =
− + −          
(28) 
Our special CD parameter assumptions—sector N = sector 1, sector B = sector 
2—were:  
1 1 2 2;1 1 ; 1 ;1 ; ; 1n ba a a aα α α α α α α α= − = − = − − = = = −      (29) 
Inserting (29) into (28), we get the basic GE formulas for our two autarky 
economies (n, b):  
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 2 1
2 1n n n n n n
k w r w r
α α
α α
− −
= Ψ = ⋅
−              
(30) 
( ) ( )
( )
1 2 11
1 2 1n n n n
w r k
α α
α α
− −= Ψ = =
− −                
(31) 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
2 1
1 2 1b b b b b b
k w r w r
α α
α α
−
= Ψ = ⋅
− −              
(32) 
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2 11
2 1b b b b
w r k
α α
α α
− − −= Ψ = =
−                
(33) 
Relative factor price expressions (31) and (33) are seen in Table 1, line 7 and 
Figure 6. 
The CD relative commodity price (unit-cost) functions in our two-sector eco- 
nomies are given by, cf. Jensen [[22], p. 59; equation (14)], Varian [[25], p. 55]:  
( )
( )
( ) [ )
2 2 12
11
11
2 2 21 2 1
1
2 1 21 1 1
1
; ; 0,
1
a a aa
B
aa
N
a ap p p pw w r
p r p p pa a
γ
γ
−− −
−
−   = = = ∈ ∞   −     
(34) 
With 1 2 1γ γ= =  and using (29), the relative price formulas (34) are easily 
seen to become,  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 21 21
2
; ; ,B j j
N
p pw r w r j b n
p p
αα − −−= = =
           
(35) 
By relative factor prices (31) and (33) and the relative price (cost) expression 
(35), we get:  
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2
1 1 2 1 2 1
2 1
Bn
n n
Nn
p
w r
p
α
α α α
α α
−
− −  − −
= =  
−                
(36) 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2
1 1 2 2 1
1 2 1
Bb
b b
Nb
p
w r
p
α
α α α
α α
−
− −  −
= =  
− −               
(37) 
The relative commodity price expressions (36) and (37) are seen in Table 1, 
line 8. 
By the Equations ((9), (10)) of section 2.2, and wage-rental expressions (31), 
(33), we get,  
( )
( ) ( )
22 1 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
n
Nn
n
w
k
r
α αα α α
α α α α α α
−
= ⋅ = ⋅ =
− − − − − −         
(38) 
( )
( )
( )
( )
22 1 2 11 1
1 2 1 1 2 1
n
Bn
n
w
k
r
α α αα α
α α α α α α
− −− −
= ⋅ = ⋅ =
− − − −         
(39) 
( )
( )
( )
( )2
1 2 1 1 2 1
1 1 2 1 2 1
b
Nb
b
w
k
r
α α α αα α
α α α α α
− − − −
= ⋅ = ⋅ =
− − − −         
(40) 
( )
( )
( )
2
1 2 1 1 2 11 1
2 1 2
b
Bb
b
w
k
r
α α α αα α
α α α α α
− − − −− −
= ⋅ = ⋅ =
−         
(41) 
The GE sectoral capital-labor ratios, (38-41) are implied by the lines (1-4) in 
Table 1. 
The fractions of labor (capital) of country (j) employed in sector 1 are given 
by, cf. Jensen [[11], p. 68; equation 72], and Jensen [[22], p. 73; equation 78],  
( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2 1 1 1
2 2 1 2 2 1
1
, 1 ;
1
j j j j j j
j j j j j j
L a L L K a
L a a a L L K a a a
α α
α α
−
= = − =
− + − − −    
(42) 
Inserting (29) into (42) gives sector fractions of labor (capital) for autarky 
economies (n,b):  
( )
21 ;
2 1 2 1
Nn Bn Nn
n n n
L L K
L L K
α
α α
= = =
− −               
(43) 
( )
( )
21 1, 1 ;
1 2 1 2
Nb Bb Nb Nb Bb
b b b b b
L L L K K
L L L K K
α
α α
−
= = − = =
− −         
(44) 
which appear in the lines (1-4) of Table 1. The equations (1-2), (11-12) of 
section 2.2, and factor ratios (38-41), fractions (43-44), give the autarky outputs 
in countries (n,b):  
( )
( )
( )
22
1
11 1,
1 2 1 1 2 12 2n Nn Nn b Nb Nb
N L k N L k
αα
α α
α α
αα
α α α α−
   −
= = = =   
− − − −         
(45) 
( )
( ) ( )
12 2
1 1
1
11 1,
1 2 1 1 2 12 2n Bn Bn b Bb Bb
B L k B L k
α α
α α
α α
α α
α α α α
−
− −
−
   −
= = = =   
− − − −       
(46) 
which are seen in lines (5-6) of Table 1. Obtaining the distribution of these 
outputs among the consumers in lines (9-12) are safely left to our alert readers. 
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Table 2. The seminal study of 2 × 2 × 2 trade models is Oniki and Uzawa [26]. 
However, they only offered qualitative relations and results. Parametric closed 
form expressions, as in Table 2, are not available anywhere. On the background 
of Table 1 and the analytic expressions in this Appendix, we briefly outline how 
formulas in Table 2 are obtained. 
We have assumed free trade between our two countries, ,j b n= . Thus by 
absence of frictions of trade, the law of one commodity price, and hence one 
relative price (p) apply:  
, , , :Bj B Nj N b B N np p p p j b n p p p p p= = = = = =         (47) 
Country trades are here always balanced, and world market equilibrium 
implies:  
( )Bj j Bj Bn n BnX B Q X B Q= − = − = − −                (48) 
where BjX  are exports (imports = BjX− ) of good B by country (j); BjQ  is 
domestic demand (absorption) of good B by country (j). The relative price p, 
(47), (world market equilibrium terms of trade) is derived by solving the trade 
balance (“reciprocal demand, offer-curves”) equation, (48)—reflecting specific 
forms of production and utility functions in both countries. With parameters (29) 
and 1b nk k= = , it can be proved, cf. (54), that  
1b B N np p p p p= = = =                    (49) 
Then by (49) and (35), we get wage-rental ratios, and next capital-labor ratios 
by (38-41):  
1 11; , , ,
1 1b b n n Nn Bn Nb Bb
w r w r k k k kα α α α
α α α α
− −
= = = = = =
− −   
(50) 
With 1Nn n Nb bL L L L α= = − , same technologies and factor prices imply 
same outputs:  
( ) ( )11 1
1n Nn Nn Nb Nb b
N L k L k N
α
αα α ααα α α
α
− = = − = − = = −       
(51) 
( )
1
11 11 1n Bn Bn Bb Bb bB L k L k B
α
αα α ααα α α
α
−
−− −− = = = − = =         
(52) 
Remark. For parameter set (29), relative prices (49) are replaced (not proved 
here) by,  
( ) ( ) ( )
2 1
2 1 1 2 1 ,B N b n b np p p k k k k
α
α α α α
−
 = = − + − − = Φ        
(53) 
2 1: ; 1: 1b n B N B Nk k k p p p k k p p p
α −= = = = = = =        (54) 
Thus (49) [independent of α]—with α-expressions (50-52), seen in Table 2— 
is an extreme (simplest) version of terms of trade (53-54) in 2 × 2 × 2 GE models 
with CD parameters (29).  
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